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Repricing and Executive Turnover
Author(s) -
Subramanian Narayanan,
Chakraborty Atreya,
Sheikh Shahbaz
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
financial review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.621
H-Index - 47
eISSN - 1540-6288
pISSN - 0732-8516
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6288.2007.00164.x
Subject(s) - business , stock (firearms) , turnover , economics , management , engineering , mechanical engineering
We examine whether the threat of executive turnover faced by a firm affects its decision to reprice stock options held by its executives. We estimate a model of voluntary turnover among top executives and show that the predicted turnover from this model is positively related to the probability of repricing. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of several known determinants of repricing. Our results are consistent with a model in which a tight labor market makes executives hard to replace, forcing firms to reprice stock options when they go underwater.