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Multiple Bids, Management Opposition, and the Market for Corporate Control
Author(s) -
Lefanowicz Craig E.,
Robinson John R.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
financial review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.621
H-Index - 47
eISSN - 1540-6288
pISSN - 0732-8516
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6288.2000.tb01432.x
Subject(s) - opposition (politics) , negotiation , shareholder , management control system , tender offer , business , economics , accounting , microeconomics , monetary economics , finance , control (management) , corporate governance , management , political science , law , politics
We use regression analysis to disentangle the wealth effect for acquired firm shareholders of management opposition and multiple bids (e.g., multiple bidders and bid revisions). Although multiple bidders and bid revisions occur more frequently for opposed acquisitions, opposition is not associated with incremental acquisition returns for acquisitions with multiple bidders. We also find that management opposition has no significant incremental effect on single bidder acquisitions unless the acquiring firm revises its initial bid. These findings indicate that rather than amplifying acqiuisition returns directly, management opposition instead serves as a negotiating tool to solicit additional bids.