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Voluntary Corporate Divestitures as Antitakeover Mechanisms
Author(s) -
Loh Charmen,
Bezjak Jennifer Russell,
Toms Harrison
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
financial review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.621
H-Index - 47
eISSN - 1540-6288
pISSN - 0732-8516
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6288.1995.tb00824.x
Subject(s) - divestment , business , monetary economics , turnover , industrial organization , economics , finance , management
This paper examines the investor reaction to the use of corporate selloffs as antitakeover devices. The results show that firms subject to takeover speculations prior to the divestiture announcement experience insignificant changes in share prices while firms that have no takeover bid report significant wealth increases. The majority of the firms that undergo defensive divestitures remain independent one year after the selloffs. These findings are consistent with the authors' proposition that investors regard divestitures following rumors of takeover attempt as antitakeover strategies. On the other hand, investors perceive selloffs in a takeover‐free environment as a positive net present value decision.