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Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors
Author(s) -
BEBCHUK LUCIAN A.,
GRINSTEIN YANIV,
PEYER URS
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01618.x
Subject(s) - corporate governance , compensation (psychology) , accounting , executive compensation , business , product (mathematics) , management , finance , economics , psychology , geometry , mathematics , psychoanalysis
We study the relation between opportunistic timing of option grants and corporate governance failures, focusing on “lucky” grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. Option grant practices were designed to provide lucky grants not only to executives but also to independent directors. Lucky grants to both CEOs and directors were the product of deliberate choices, not of firms’ routines, and were timed to make them more profitable. Lucky grants are associated with higher CEO compensation from other sources, no majority of independent directors, no outside blockholder on the compensation committee, and a long‐serving CEO.