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Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining
Author(s) -
MATSA DAVID A.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01565.x
Subject(s) - bargaining power , position (finance) , debt , incentive , collective bargaining , cash flow , economics , wage , business , capital structure , labour economics , capital (architecture) , finance , microeconomics , archaeology , history
I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier—organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm‐level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.