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Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols
Author(s) -
BAEK JAESEUNG,
KANG JUNKOO,
LEE INMOO
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01062.x
Subject(s) - issuer , chaebol , business , shareholder , equity (law) , financial system , monetary economics , finance , economics , corporate governance , political science , law
We examine whether equity‐linked private securities offerings are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms that belong to a Korean chaebol. We find that chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offering prices to benefit their controlling shareholders. We also find that chaebol issuers (member acquirers) realize an 8.8% (5.8%) higher (lower) announcement return than do other types of issuers (acquirers) if they sell private securities at a premium to other member firms, and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership in issuers and acquirers. These results are consistent with tunneling within business groups.