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Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell‐Side Analysts
Author(s) -
JACKSON ANDREW R.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00743.x
Subject(s) - reputation , incentive , optimism , investment banking , business , set (abstract data type) , investment (military) , industrial organization , finance , economics , microeconomics , computer science , political science , psychology , social psychology , programming language , politics , law
This paper examines the trade‐generation and reputation‐building incentives facing sell‐side analysts. Using a unique data set I demonstrate that optimistic analysts generate more trade for their brokerage firms, as do high reputation analysts. I also find that accurate analysts generate higher reputations. The analyst therefore faces a conflict between telling the truth to build her reputation versus misleading investors via optimistic forecasts to generate short‐term increases in trading commissions. In equilibrium I show forecast optimism can exist, even when investment‐banking affiliations are removed. The conclusions may have important policy implications given recent changes in the institutional structure of the brokerage industry.