Premium
When It's Not The Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market
Author(s) -
LAMOUREUX CHRISTOPHER G.,
SCHNITZLEIN CHARLES R.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04818.x
Subject(s) - insider , market liquidity , quality (philosophy) , price discovery , asset (computer security) , business , insider trading , commerce , microeconomics , economics , financial economics , monetary economics , finance , philosophy , computer security , epistemology , political science , computer science , law , futures contract
ABSTRACT We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk‐neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.