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Corporate Control and the Choice of Investment Financing: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions
Author(s) -
AMIHUD YAKOV,
LEV BARUCH,
TRAVLOS NICKOLAOS G.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
the journal of finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 18.151
H-Index - 299
eISSN - 1540-6261
pISSN - 0022-1082
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03706.x
Subject(s) - business , corporate finance , cash , debt , stock (firearms) , finance , control (management) , debt financing , external financing , monetary economics , financial system , economics , mechanical engineering , management , engineering
We test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing—cash (and debt) or stock. Corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control. Our empirical results support this hypothesis: in corporate acquisitions, the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing. Also, the previously observed negative bidders' abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership.