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President O bama, the Senate, and the Polarized Politics of Treaty Making*
Author(s) -
Peake Jeffrey S.,
Krutz Glen S.,
Hughes Tyler
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
social science quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.482
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1540-6237
pISSN - 0038-4941
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00913.x
Subject(s) - treaty , political science , diplomacy , context (archaeology) , foreign policy , politics , polarization (electrochemistry) , bama , law , public administration , political economy , sociology , geography , chemistry , biochemistry , archaeology , escherichia coli , bacterial outer membrane , gene
Objective We examine P resident O bama's use of international agreements as he pursued his foreign policy agenda during his first three years in office. While P resident O bama uses executive agreements at similar levels as previous presidents, he has used the treaty mechanism far less often. This presents an interesting puzzle: Why has O bama used so few treaties when his own party controls the S enate? Methods We address this puzzle by analyzing O bama alongside other presidents in analyses of treaty use and in presidents’ experience with treaty delay employing ordinary least squares (OLS) and maximum likelihood estimation regression techniques. We also utilize the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ( START ) and O bama's use of treaty priority lists as qualitative case studies. Results The various findings together suggest that the rise of partisan polarization, including conservatives’ propensity to oppose significant treaties, factors into O bama's decisions to use treaties when completing major diplomacy. Conclusions The partisan context of the S enate provides a substantial constraint on presidents looking to cement important new foreign policies through international agreements.