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Does Seniority Matter? The Conditional Influence of State Methods of Judicial Retention *
Author(s) -
Boyea Brent D.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
social science quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.482
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1540-6237
pISSN - 0038-4941
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00689.x
Subject(s) - seniority , dissent , supreme court , state (computer science) , law , state supreme court , political science , politics , algorithm , computer science
Objective. Capitalizing on attention directed to judicial agreement and the associated consequences of judicial elections, this article conducts an examination of the effects of seniority and state methods of judicial retention on decisions by state supreme court justices to dissent. Methods. Using data drawn from the State Supreme Court Data Archive, this research analyzes decisions by individual justices to dissent in 33,582 tort cases from 1995 to 1998. GEE logistic analysis with cases as the clustering unit is the estimation procedure. Results. While the seniority of justices is positively connected to dissent, the findings illustrate that seniority's effect is nuanced and conditioned by a state's method of judicial retention. The impact of a justice's seniority relative to his or her colleagues is most powerful in appointive courts where justices serve without fear of electoral retaliation. Alternatively, within elective courts, justices respond to elections by pursuing a consensual approach regardless of their seniority. Conclusion. The dissent characteristics of justices in state supreme courts are intricately tied to the length of careers and the methods by which states keep justices in office.