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Strategy and Accountability: Structural Reform Litigation and Public Management
Author(s) -
Bertelli Anthony Michael
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
public administration review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.721
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1540-6210
pISSN - 0033-3352
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00344.x
Subject(s) - accountability , agency (philosophy) , plaintiff , context (archaeology) , bureaucracy , incentive , public interest , law and economics , business , public administration , law , political science , economics , sociology , politics , market economy , paleontology , social science , biology
Structural reform litigation involves legal action against public bureaucracies alleging that an official has violated the legal rights of an agency's client. A pattern of rights infringements raises the specter of systemic dysfunction. If the court finds for the plaintiffs, or if the defendant agency agrees to settle, the remedy reconstitutes agency operations. What are the incentives faced by public managers whose agencies are involved in structural reform litigation? How might public managers retain public accountability while strategically using the institutional arrangements present in such cases? This article examines these questions through a spatial bargaining model and discusses its analytical implications in the context of a comprehensive suit against the child welfare agency in Kansas City, Missouri.