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Est‐ce que les pays devraient bloquer la prise de contrôle par des intérêts étrangers de champions nationaux en R&D et encourager l’investissement direct de l’étranger dans les jeunes pousses?
Author(s) -
Bertrand Olivier,
Hakkala Katariiilsson,
Norbäck PehrJohan,
Persson Lars
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2012.01728.x
Subject(s) - greenfield project , business , skepticism , quality (philosophy) , economics , industrial organization , monetary economics , foreign direct investment , macroeconomics , philosophy , epistemology
In R&D intensive industries, governments promote greenfield foreign investments, while being sceptical towards foreign acquisitions of domestic high‐quality firms. We develop a theoretical model that shows that foreign acquisitions are conducive to high‐quality targets because of strategic effects on the sales price. However, foreign firms ‘cherry pick’ high‐quality targets to expand R&D rather than to downsize. Otherwise, rivals expand R&D, making the acquisition unprofitable. Thus, our model predicts that acquired affiliates invest more in R&D than greenfield affiliates. Using affiliate data, we find evidence that acquired affiliates have a higher level of sequential R&D intensity than greenfield affiliates.