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Est‐ce que l’information cachée rend la libéralisation du commerce plus fragile?
Author(s) -
Herzing Mathias
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01644.x
Subject(s) - ex ante , welfare economics , merge (version control) , context (archaeology) , liberalization , economics , mathematics , geography , computer science , market economy , archaeology , information retrieval , macroeconomics
This paper focuses on the impact of hidden information on strategic interaction in the context of trade agreements. In the presence of informational asymmetry it is possible that a tradeoff between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation emerges. It is shown that it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization associated with a strictly positive ex ante probability of deviation occurring. In that case, cooperation will break down in finite time, and the optimal degree of liberalization cannot be applied indefinitely.