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Hasard moral, réclamations d'assurance et contrats d'assurance rénouvelés .
Author(s) -
Robinson Chris,
Zheng Bingyong
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2010.01602.x
Subject(s) - moral hazard , incentive , actuarial science , ex ante , morale hazard , insurance policy , business , legislature , auto insurance risk selection , casualty insurance , affect (linguistics) , key person insurance , economics , microeconomics , political science , psychology , law , macroeconomics , communication
The paper develops a simple model of repeated automobile insurance contracts, providing a framework for analyzing changes in aggregate insurance data in periods of changes that affect driver incentives. Experience rating of premiums gives drivers an incentive to exert effort to avoid accidents (ex ante moral hazard), and an incentive to hide accidents (ex post moral hazard). The empirical analysis, using data from the competitive insurance markets in Ontario and Alberta over a period of major legislative changes in Ontario, suggests that much of the recent decline in accidents in Ontario was due to an increased incentive to hide accidents.