Premium
Fragmentation du revenu, spécialisation et répartition intra‐familiale .
Author(s) -
Gugl Elisabeth
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01538.x
Subject(s) - wife , labour supply , economics , labour economics , welfare , term (time) , distribution (mathematics) , control (management) , inequality , market economy , political science , law , mathematical analysis , physics , mathematics , quantum mechanics , management
Income splitting for tax purposes results in more specialization of wives, but does this in turn generate more gender inequality? In my dynamic bargaining model with a divorce threatpoint, I find that who controls the couple's labour supply plays a crucial role in establishing this link. If spouses choose their labour supply non‐cooperatively, only the husband's increase – but not her own decrease – in labour supply introduces a negative term in the wife's change in welfare. If the wife does not control her own labour supply, a decrease in her own labour supply introduces an additional negative term.