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Structure syndicale et incitations des firmes à des investissements coopératifs en R&D.
Author(s) -
Manasakis Constantine,
Petrakis Emmanuel
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01523.x
Subject(s) - incentive , wage , welfare , economics , microeconomics , labour economics , industrial organization , business , market economy
Abstract We investigate the impact of alternative unionization structures on firms' incentives to invest on cost‐reducing R&D and to form Research Joint Ventures (RJVs), in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that if firms invest non‐cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are higher under centralized rather than under decentralized wage‐setting. In contrast, investments are always higher under decentralized wage‐setting in the case of RJVs. Firms' incentives to form an RJV are stronger under centralized wage‐setting if and only if spillovers are low enough. Finally, centralized wage‐setting may hinder the formation of costly RJVs and their potential welfare benefits.