Premium
Politique commerciale et entreprises mixtes .
Author(s) -
Van Long Ngo,
Stähler Frank
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2009.01520.x
Subject(s) - rivalry , subsidy , cournot competition , tariff , export subsidy , economics , microeconomics , production (economics) , government (linguistics) , welfare , state (computer science) , commercial policy , optimal tax , protectionism , international economics , business , market economy , philosophy , linguistics , algorithm , computer science
This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.