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Traitement identique des entités domestiques ou importées et la réglementation optimale des externalités environnementales .
Author(s) -
Gulati Sumeet,
Roy Devesh
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00511.x
Subject(s) - social planner , externality , economics , consumption (sociology) , product (mathematics) , welfare , public economics , dynamic inconsistency , production (economics) , control (management) , microeconomics , market economy , social science , geometry , mathematics , management , sociology
. We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare‐maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare‐maximizing policy to violate National Treatment.