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Concurrence pour des clients exclusifs: comparaisons de l’équilibre et du niveau de bien‐être quand des tarifications en une ou deux parties sont en vigueur .
Author(s) -
Reitzes James D.,
Woroch Glenn A.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00496.x
Subject(s) - monopolization , economics , microeconomics , social welfare , pricing schedule , unit (ring theory) , welfare , competition (biology) , price discrimination , average cost pricing , limit price , rational pricing , price level , monopoly , econometrics , monetary economics , market economy , ecology , mathematics education , mathematics , capital asset pricing model , political science , law , biology
. This paper compares one‐part and two‐part pricing in a discrete‐continuous choice model, providing more extensive welfare results than prior literature. Under two‐part pricing, firms may set fixed fees with or without ‘unit‐price commitment,’ where the lack of unit‐price commitment is consistent with ‘after‐market monopolization.’ We find that two‐part pricing with unit‐price commitment is firms’ dominant unilateral and joint pricing policy. Two‐part pricing without unit‐price commitment is the least desirable policy from a welfare standpoint. Under appropriate conditions, one‐part pricing produces the highest consumer and social welfare, but the lowest profits.