Premium
Réseaux de connaissance entre des firmes syndiquées.
Author(s) -
Mauleon Ana,
SempereMonerris Jose J.,
Vannetelbosch Vincent
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00493.x
Subject(s) - oligopoly , bargaining power , order (exchange) , pareto principle , microeconomics , network effect , pareto optimal , stability (learning theory) , power (physics) , economics , business , industrial organization , labour economics , computer science , set (abstract data type) , operations management , physics , finance , quantum mechanics , machine learning , cournot competition , programming language
. We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.