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Hétérogénéité des pays du Sud et politiques de propriété intellectuelle dans ces pays.
Author(s) -
Kim JeongEon,
Lapan Harvey E.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00490.x
Subject(s) - intellectual property , incentive , product (mathematics) , international trade , property rights , economics , business , international economics , market economy , microeconomics , political science , law , geometry , mathematics
. We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectual property rights. We find that, in a non‐cooperative equilibrium, governments resist IPR protection, but collectively southern countries benefit from some protection. We show that, in general, countries with more efficient firms prefer higher collective IPR protection than those with less efficient firms. Given the aggregate level of IPR protection, it is more efficient if the more efficient countries have weaker IPR protection.