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La fourniture privée et publique de biens publics purs et les effets de distorsion de l'impôt sur les revenus: une approche en terme d'économie politique .
Author(s) -
Itaya Junichi,
Schweinberger A.G.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2006.00380.x
Subject(s) - economics , public good , welfare , government (linguistics) , distribution (mathematics) , income tax , private good , pareto principle , public economics , income distribution , politics , labour economics , microeconomics , inequality , market economy , linguistics , philosophy , political science , law , mathematical analysis , operations management , mathematics
A pure public good is provided by the government and the voluntary contributions of two types of households. The government finances its contribution by means of income taxation. The latter has distortionary effects. A third type of household never makes contributions. We analyse the effects of changes in the income tax rate on (a) the provision of the public good, (b) the private contributions of the households, and (c) changes in the distribution of income and welfare between contributing and non‐contributing households. We derive a simple and testable condition under which the lowering of the income tax entails a Pareto improvement.