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Externalités informationnelles et échantillons d'expérimentation forfaitaires .
Author(s) -
Haritchabalet Carole,
Renault Régis
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2006.00379.x
Subject(s) - externality , sample (material) , benchmark (surveying) , welfare , microeconomics , economics , sampling (signal processing) , econometrics , value of information , nothing , sensitivity (control systems) , value (mathematics) , strategic complements , elasticity (physics) , mathematical economics , computer science , statistics , mathematics , engineering , geography , philosophy , epistemology , materials science , filter (signal processing) , electronic engineering , chemistry , composite material , geodesy , chromatography , market economy , computer vision
We consider a game of strategic experimentation where agents are restricted to an all‐or‐nothing sampling strategy. The strategic interaction between agents due to informational externalities is affected by the sizes of the experimentation samples and the sensitivity of information to changes in sample sizes. There is experimentation only if the overall sample is large enough. Equilibrium may involve optimal, insufficient or excessive experimentation relative to a second‐best welfare benchmark. This unusual over‐experimentation result is associated not necessarily with large samples but with a low elasticity of the value of information with respect to the sample size.