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Information Exchange in Policy Networks
Author(s) -
Leifeld Philip,
Schneider Volker
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00580.x
Subject(s) - reputation , transaction cost , politics , similarity (geometry) , preference , outreach , german , information exchange , business , public economics , microeconomics , computer science , economics , political science , artificial intelligence , telecommunications , archaeology , law , image (mathematics) , history , economic growth
Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similarity, influence reputation, social trust, and institutional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemicals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity is absorbed by institutional, relational, and social opportunity structures. Political actors choose contacts who minimize transaction costs while maximizing outreach and information. We also find that different types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.