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Endogenous Parties in an Assembly
Author(s) -
Eguia Jon X.
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00481.x
Subject(s) - voting , stylized fact , bullet voting , disapproval voting , cardinal voting systems , ideology , anti plurality voting , politics , affect (linguistics) , outcome (game theory) , political economy , split ticket voting , political science , economics , microeconomics , law , sociology , macroeconomics , communication
In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide.