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Diversionary Despots? Comparing Autocracies' Propensities to Use and to Benefit from Military Force
Author(s) -
Pickering Jeffrey,
Kisangani Emizet F.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00442.x
Subject(s) - autocracy , incentive , reciprocal , politics , positive economics , economics , empirical research , social psychology , microeconomics , psychology , econometrics , political science , democracy , law , mathematics , statistics , linguistics , philosophy
This article adds to recent research that has begun to systematically analyze the varied conflict propensities of autocracies. Using political incentive theory, we develop hypotheses on the diversionary proclivities of three distinct types of autocratic regimes that contradict conventional wisdom and the findings of recent empirical studies. To provide a full rendering of autocracies' diversionary tendencies, we test our hypotheses with Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) models that capture reciprocal relationships among external military force and four of its potential domestic causes from 1950 to 2005. Although our results provide only partial support for political incentive theory, they demonstrate the utility of using properly identified reciprocal models and of analyzing refined conceptualizations of autocratic regimes. We find that certain types of autocracies are more prone to use diversionary force and to benefit from it than others.