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Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?
Author(s) -
Wittman Donald
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00388.x
Subject(s) - intuition , shadow (psychology) , pessimism , economics , outcome (game theory) , private information retrieval , microeconomics , computer science , computer security , psychology , philosophy , epistemology , psychotherapist , cognitive science
This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.