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Elections and Activist Coalitions in the United States
Author(s) -
Schofield Norman,
Miller Gary
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00265.x
Subject(s) - assertion , contradiction , voting , political science , political economy , valence (chemistry) , positive economics , law and economics , economics , law , computer science , epistemology , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , politics , programming language
Formal models of voting have emphasizd the mean voter theorem, that all parties should rationally adopt identical positions at the electoral mean. The lack of evidence for this assertion is a paradox or contradiction in need of resolution. This article attempts to resolve this paradox by considering an electoral model that includes “valence” or nonpolicy judgements by voters of party leaders. The theorem is used to suggest that Republican success depends on balancing the opposed demands of economic and social conservatives. Democrat success in future elections resides in overcoming the policy demands of economic liberals and gaining support from cosmopolitans—the socially liberal but economically conservative potential supporters of the party .