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A Rawlsian Argument Against the Duty of Civility
Author(s) -
Thunder David
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00209.x
Subject(s) - civility , duty , politics , argument (complex analysis) , liberalism , law and economics , political science , underpinning , law , sociology , philosophy , civil engineering , engineering , biochemistry , chemistry
In this article, I show that the assumptions underpinning John Rawls's so‐called “duty of civility” ought to lead one not to affirm the duty but to reject it. I will begin by setting out in its essentials the content and rationale of the “duty of civility,” which lies at the heart of Rawls's ideal of public reason. Secondly, I will argue that the very premises allegedly underpinning the duty of civility—namely, the values of reciprocity and political autonomy, and the burdens of judgment—in fact rule it out. Thirdly, I will suggest that if my argument against the duty of civility is correct, then one recent attempt to salvage political liberalism and reasonableness from the charge of incoherence fails. Finally, I draw some challenging lessons from our discussion for political liberalism and the liberal tradition as a whole.