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Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Effects of Accountability and Obstacles to Policy Change
Author(s) -
Hicken Allen,
Satyanath Shanker,
Sergenti Ernest
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
american journal of political science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.347
H-Index - 170
eISSN - 1540-5907
pISSN - 0092-5853
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00162.x
Subject(s) - veto , shock (circulatory) , politics , accountability , devaluation , exchange rate , economics , test (biology) , political science , macroeconomics , law , medicine , paleontology , biology
Numerous analyses have been conducted on how political institutions affect economic performance. In recent years the emphasis has been on a causal logic that emphasizes institutional obstacles to policy change, such as those presented by multiple veto points. This has especially been the case when it comes to the important question of how political institutions influence governments' responses to exogenous economic shocks. We make the case for a substantial broadening of focus and show that when it comes to a major type of exogenous shock, a forced exchange‐rate devaluation, variations in the breadth of accountability of the chief executive are more robustly associated with the post‐shock growth recovery than variations in obstacles to policy change. We first argue that the size of the winning coalition will be positively associated with growth recoveries following forced devaluations. We then use a newly developed measure of the size of the winning coalition to test our claim. Our statistical analysis is based on a study of the responses of 44 countries to forced exchange‐rate devaluations in the late 1990s.