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Armed, and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control
Author(s) -
Tyler Tom R.,
Callahan Patrick E.,
Frost Jeffrey
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
law and society review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.867
H-Index - 74
eISSN - 1540-5893
pISSN - 0023-9216
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5893.2007.00304.x
Subject(s) - discretion , misconduct , argument (complex analysis) , rule of law , enforcement , law enforcement , power (physics) , control (management) , social control , law and economics , law , political science , business , sociology , economics , politics , medicine , physics , management , quantum mechanics
A key concern within democracies is effectively regulating the behavior of societies' agents of social control, who have coercive power and considerable discretion over their use of that power. This can result in failures to adhere to the rules, policies, and laws dictating appropriate and lawful behavior. This article explores the effectiveness of motivating rule adherence among law enforcement officers and soldiers by focusing upon whether they believe that organizational authorities are legitimate or that rules and policies are morally right or wrong. The results suggest that both values have an important influence upon rule adherence. Further, aspects of organizational culture that encourage such values are identified and shown to be influential in this setting. Results show that the procedural justice of the organization is central to rule adherence. These findings support the argument that encouraging self‐regulation via appeals to the values of law enforcement officers and soldiers is a viable strategy for minimizing misconduct, and they suggest how to effectively implement such approaches.