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Effects of Administrators' Aspirations, Political Principals' Priorities, and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests
Author(s) -
RYU JAY EUNGHA,
BOWLING CYNTHIA J.,
CHO CHUNGLAE,
WRIGHT DEIL S.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
public budgeting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.694
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1540-5850
pISSN - 0275-1100
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5850.2007.00873.x
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , legislature , politics , state (computer science) , public administration , principal–agent problem , public relations , business , accounting , economics , political science , finance , sociology , law , computer science , social science , corporate governance , algorithm
This article addresses a long‐standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests.