Premium
The Line‐Item Veto in Georgia: Fiscal Restraint or Inter‐Branch Politics?
Author(s) -
LAUTH THOMAS P.,
REESE CATHERINE C.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
public budgeting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.694
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1540-5850
pISSN - 0275-1100
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5850.2006.00844.x
Subject(s) - veto , governor , legislature , state (computer science) , liberian dollar , politics , government (linguistics) , economics , public economics , fiscal policy , public administration , finance , political science , macroeconomics , law , computer science , engineering , linguistics , philosophy , algorithm , aerospace engineering
This article about use of the line‐item veto in Georgia concludes that the item veto has been used not as an instrument for reducing the budget total or the size of state government, but as an instrument for protecting the executive budget. Using appropriations data and drawing upon interviews with participants in the budget process, including seven governors, the authors present evidence that in Georgia the item veto (1) is not frequently used, (2) when used, is more likely to remove legislative language than delete dollar amounts, and (3) enables the spending priorities and fiscal policy preferences of the governor to prevail as state policy.