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Congressional Delegation of Spending Power to the Defense Department in the Post‐9–11 Period
Author(s) -
CANDREVA PHILIP J.,
JONES L. R.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
public budgeting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.694
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1540-5850
pISSN - 0275-1100
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5850.2005.00370.x
Subject(s) - delegation , appropriation , power (physics) , public administration , relevance (law) , business , political science , law , philosophy , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics
The advantages of increased delegation of resource management authority by Congress have long been argued by defense leadership. It is an important issue because of its relevance to congressional assessment of defense management, budget priorities, and how to enforce policy preferences. This paper investigates the series of supplemental appropriations for the war on terrorism to determine (a) under what conditions, and how and why Congress delegates budget authority to defense, (b) what happened with respect to the degree of delegation after appropriation during budget execution, and (c) what this case teaches us about the evolving budgetary relationship between Congress and the Defense Department.