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Viability of Auction‐Based Revenue Management in Sequential Markets
Author(s) -
Baker Tim,
Murthy Nagesh N.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
decision sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.238
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1540-5915
pISSN - 0011-7315
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-5414.2005.00073.x
Subject(s) - common value auction , revenue management , revenue , key (lock) , exploit , yield management , reverse auction , computer science , revenue equivalence , microeconomics , business , combinatorial auction , auction theory , economics , finance , computer security
The Internet is providing an opportunity to revenue management practitioners to exploit the potential of auctions as a new price distribution channel. We develop a stochastic model for a high‐level abstraction of a revenue management system (RMS) that allows us to understand the potential of incorporating auctions in revenue management in the presence of forecast errors associated with key parameters. Our abstraction is for an environment where two market segments book in sequence and revenue management approaches consider auctions in none, one, or both segments. Key insights from our robust results are (i) limited auctions are best employed closest to the final sale date, (ii) counterbalancing forecast errors associated with overall traffic intensity and the proportion of customer arrivals in a segment is more important if an auction is adopted in that segment, and (iii) it is critically important not to err on the side of overestimating market willingness to pay.