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A Game‐Theoretic View of Voting
Author(s) -
Krueger Joachim I.,
Acevedo Melissa
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
journal of social issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.618
H-Index - 122
eISSN - 1540-4560
pISSN - 0022-4537
DOI - 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00573.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , victory , voting , turnout , dilemma , rationality , outcome (game theory) , politics , public good , social psychology , law and economics , political science , positive economics , economics , psychology , microeconomics , law , epistemology , biochemistry , chemistry , philosophy
Two game‐theoretic arguments for the potential rationality of voting are presented. The first argument suggests that people make choices that allow the most favorable forecasts. People choose to vote inasmuch as they project their own choices between voting and abstaining more strongly onto members of their own political group than onto members of other political groups. Relevant evidence is reviewed and extended by new findings in a simulated public‐goods dilemma. The second argument suggests that people preview how they will feel about each of the four possible scenarios generated by the conjunctions of their own choices (to vote or to abstain) and the election outcome (victory or defeat). They choose to vote inasmuch as they feel their own vote will not be wasted. The implications of both arguments for efforts to increase turnout are discussed.