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A Theory of the Demand for Underwriting
Author(s) -
Browne Mark J.,
Kamiya Shinichi
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
journal of risk and insurance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.055
H-Index - 63
eISSN - 1539-6975
pISSN - 0022-4367
DOI - 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01436.x
Subject(s) - underwriting , adverse selection , medical underwriting , nash equilibrium , set (abstract data type) , microeconomics , economics , business , actuarial science , insurance policy , computer science , general insurance , programming language , income protection insurance
We examine the demand for underwriting and its effect on equilibrium in an insurance market in which insureds know their risk type, but insurers do not. Our analysis indicates that a set of policies including one that requires buyers to take an underwriting test can constitute a full coverage Nash equilibrium when perfect classification is possible. We also find that underwriting equilibria, in which low risks obtain greater coverage than they would without underwriting, widely exist in a Wilsonian market with nonmyopic insurers. Our findings provide a potential explanation for why empirical evidence on adverse selection is mixed.