Premium
Adverse Selection and the Opaqueness of Insurers
Author(s) -
Zhang Tao,
Cox Larry A.,
Van Ness Robert A.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
journal of risk and insurance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.055
H-Index - 63
eISSN - 1539-6975
pISSN - 0022-4367
DOI - 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01300.x
Subject(s) - adverse selection , underwriting , business , selection (genetic algorithm) , asset (computer security) , actuarial science , computer security , artificial intelligence , computer science
While adverse selection problems between insureds and insurers are well known to insurance researchers, few explore adverse selection in the insurance industry from a capital markets perspective. This study examines adverse selection in the quoted prices of insurers' common stocks with a particular focus on the opacity of both asset portfolios and underwriting liabilities. We find that more opaque underwriting lines result in greater adverse selection costs for property‐casualty (P‐C) insurers. A similar effect is not apparent for life‐health (L‐H) insurers and we find no effect of asset opaqueness on adverse selection for either L‐H or P‐C insurers.