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Adverse Selection With Frequency and Severity Risk: Alternative Risk‐Sharing Provisions
Author(s) -
Ligon James A.,
Thistle Paul D.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
journal of risk and insurance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.055
H-Index - 63
eISSN - 1539-6975
pISSN - 0022-4367
DOI - 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2008.00287.x
Subject(s) - adverse selection , sort , selection (genetic algorithm) , actuarial science , business , economics , computer science , artificial intelligence , information retrieval
The analysis considers an insurance market with adverse selection where individuals' loss distributions may differ with respect to both the frequency and severity of loss. We show that the combination of deductibles and coinsurance can be used to sort rationed policyholders. Because of their screening properties, coinsurance and deductibles may both be equilibrium forms of risk sharing for a particular insurer facing asymmetric information, with different rationed consumers choosing different risk‐sharing provisions.