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Resource Distribution in Multiple Attacks with Imperfect Detection of the Attack Outcome
Author(s) -
Levitin Gregory,
Hausken Kjell
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
risk analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.972
H-Index - 130
eISSN - 1539-6924
pISSN - 0272-4332
DOI - 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01657.x
Subject(s) - contest , outcome (game theory) , resource (disambiguation) , imperfect , probabilistic logic , computer security , computer science , resource distribution , range (aeronautics) , resource allocation , economics , engineering , artificial intelligence , microeconomics , computer network , linguistics , philosophy , political science , law , aerospace engineering
This article extends the previous research of consecutive attacks strategy by assuming that an attacker observes the outcome of each attack imperfectly. With given probabilities it may wrongly identify a destroyed target as undestroyed, and wrongly identify an undestroyed target as destroyed. The outcome of each attack is determined by a contest success function that depends on the amount of resources allocated by the defender and the attacker to each attack. The article suggests a probabilistic model of the multiple attacks and analyzes how the target destruction probability and the attacker's relative resource expenditure are impacted by the two probabilities of incorrect observation, the attacker's and defender's resource ratio, the contest intensity, the number of attacks, and the resource distribution across attacks. We analyze how the attacker chooses the number of attacks, the attack stopping rule, and the optimal resource distribution across attacks to maximize its utility.