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Containment of Polioviruses After Eradication and OPV Cessation: Characterizing Risks to Improve Management
Author(s) -
Dowdle Walter,
Van Der Avoort Harrie,
De Gourville Esther,
Delpeyroux Francis,
Desphande Jagadish,
Hovi Tapani,
Martin Javier,
Pallansch Mark,
Kew Olen,
Wolff Chris
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
risk analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.972
H-Index - 130
eISSN - 1539-6924
pISSN - 0272-4332
DOI - 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00844.x
Subject(s) - poliovirus , containment (computer programming) , risk analysis (engineering) , poliomyelitis , poliomyelitis eradication , environmental health , transmission (telecommunications) , risk assessment , risk management , medicine , business , virology , computer security , computer science , virus , telecommunications , finance , programming language
The goal of the World Health Organization is to stop routine use of oral poliovirus vaccine shortly after interruption of wild poliovirus transmission. A key component of this goal is to minimize the risk of reintroduction by destruction of polioviruses except in an absolute minimum number of facilities that serve essential functions and implement effective containment. Effective containment begins with a complete facility risk assessment. This article focuses on characterizing the risks of exposure to polioviruses from the essential vaccine production, quality control, and international reference and research facilities that remain. We consider the potential exposure pathways that might lead to a poliovirus reintroduction, including para‐occupational exposures and releases to the environment, and review the literature to provide available estimates and a qualitative assessment of containment risks. Minimizing the risk of poliovirus transmission from a poliovirus facility to increasingly susceptible communities is a crucial and ongoing effort requiring understanding and actively managing the potential exposure pathways.