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A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence
Author(s) -
EGGERTSSON GAUTI B.,
LE BORGNE ERIC
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00302.x
Subject(s) - technocracy , delegation , principal–agent problem , independence (probability theory) , agency (philosophy) , principal (computer security) , incentive , delegate , economics , politics , public administration , political science , law and economics , public economics , microeconomics , sociology , computer science , management , law , computer security , social science , corporate governance , statistics , programming language , mathematics
We propose a simple theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution and then analyze under what conditions delegation is optimal for society. Our theory builds on Holmström's (1982, 1999)“hidden effort” principal–agent model. The election pressures that politicians face, and the absence of such pressures for technocrats, give rise to a dynamic incentive structure that formalizes two rationales for delegation, one highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and the other by Blinder (1998). Delegation trades off the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long‐term job contract against the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) is better insulated from the whims of public opinion. A natural application of our framework suggests a new theory of central bank independence.