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Repo Auctions and the Market for Liquidity
Author(s) -
BINDSEIL ULRICH,
NYBORG KJELL G.,
STREBULAEV ILYA A.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00261.x
Subject(s) - inefficiency , common value auction , market liquidity , collateral , monetary economics , open market operation , interbank lending market , economics , business , microeconomics , monetary policy , finance
What is the nature of imperfections in the market for liquidity? Studying bidder level data from European Central Bank (ECB) repo auctions, we find that this market appears to be informationally efficient in the sense that participants do not have private information about future short‐term rates. However, auction allocations affect banks' subsequent behavior in a way that is consistent with a degree of allocational and operational inefficiency. Also, large bidders appear to have better access to the interbank market than small ones. Finally, the evidence suggests that the ECB uses collateral haircuts that do not equilibrate opportunity costs.