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Time Inconsistency and Free‐Riding in a Monetary Union
Author(s) -
CHARI VARADARAJAN V.,
KEHOE PATRICK J.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
journal of money, credit and banking
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.763
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1538-4616
pISSN - 0022-2879
DOI - 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00162.x
Subject(s) - monetary policy , economics , free rider problem , inflation (cosmology) , monetary economics , monetary hegemony , free riding , inflation targeting , microeconomics , incentive , physics , public good , theoretical physics
In monetary unions, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free‐rider problem in the setting of non‐monetary policies. The free‐rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non‐monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. Free‐riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non‐monetary policies. Without a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free‐rider problem; then constraints on non‐monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful. This theory is here detailed and applied to several non‐monetary policies: labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation.