Sadat's Negotiations with the United States and Israel: From Sinai to Camp David

A bstract .Anwar Sadat was generally praised by Western leaders and scholars for his vision, courage, and negotiating skills. A critical examination of the documentary record shows that at least as far as negotiations and decision‐making, the dominant Western view is self‐serving. The two Egyptian‐Israeli disengagement agreements of 1974 and 1975 started Sadat on the road to the American‐sponsored peace, the price of which Sadat must have known to be the establishment of an Egypto‐American‐Israeli strategic alliance at the expense of Egypt's traditional role in the Arab world. Having accepted this outcome Sadat allowed his alternatives to narrow and bargaining power to diminish until they almost exclusively and entirely rested on what the United States and Israel were prepared to offer. To the extent that the overall strategic goal of Henry Kissinger was to separate Egypt from Arab and Palestinian aspirations, and further isolate the “radical” forces in the region, thus weakening Soviet influence and paving the way for a settlement acceptable to Israel, the American negotiator achieved his goal, with hardly any opposition from Sadat. In fact, in his eagerness to accelerate his admission into the American camp, Sadat adopted a negotiating style and made concessions which surprised the Americans themselves.