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Interest Groups, Transfer Seeking and Democratization: Competition for the Benefits of Governmental Power May Explain African Political Instability
Author(s) -
Kimenyi Mwangi S.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
american journal of economics and sociology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.199
H-Index - 38
eISSN - 1536-7150
pISSN - 0002-9246
DOI - 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1989.tb03186.x
Subject(s) - democratization , competition (biology) , democracy , economics , politics , government (linguistics) , interest group , political instability , interest rate , public economics , economic system , monetary economics , political science , linguistics , philosophy , law , biology , ecology
A bstract . The effect of permanent interest group transfer‐seeking behavior on the degree of democratization is examined, Each permanent interest group is viewed as attempting to maximize its share of wealth transfers through the political process. To maximize the share of transfers, each group undertakes competitive strategies to control the instruments of transfers. Such competition is more intense the larger the number of permanent interest groups in a given country, and the higher the likelihood that the competition would involve non‐democratic means to achieve and maintain control of the political machinery in those countries. It is predicted that the more intense the competition for transfers, which is a direct function of the number of permanent interest groups in any given country, the less democratic the system of government in that country is likely to be. This prediction is supported empirically using cross‐sectional data for 65 countries.