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‘Radical Individualism’ vs. Institutionalism, II: Philosophical Dualisms as Apologetic Constructs Based on Obsolete Psychological Preconceptions
Author(s) -
Bush Paul D.
Publication year - 1981
Publication title -
american journal of economics and sociology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.199
H-Index - 38
eISSN - 1536-7150
pISSN - 0002-9246
DOI - 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1981.tb01639.x
Subject(s) - veblen good , normative , individualism , epistemology , subjectivism , methodological individualism , libertarianism , dualism , humanism , atomism , sociology , positive economics , philosophy , neoclassical economics , economics , law , political science
A bstract .David Seckler , in his study of Veblen and the institutionalists , adopted a viewpoint which is a philosophical orientation least likely to enable him to know what Veblen and the institutionalists “really mean.” He accepted a pantheon of philosophical dualisms— e.g., “Humanism” vs. “behaviorism,”“normative” vs. “positive” — which Veblen and his followers reject, and particularly Mises's “methodological dualism” which would make science the study of ideal type individual actions instead of an experimental effort to understand the social processes of “cumulative causation” as they are found in the real world. Seckler's reliance on these obsolete psychological preconceptions of “radical individualism” causes him to neglect the powerful normative elements of Veblen's work. Yet it is precisely Veblen's normative methodology that gives rise to the “institutional dichotomy” in contemporary institutionalist thought.