Premium
RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTONOMY: THE PROBLEM OF MISSION CREEP
Author(s) -
Fischer John Martin
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2012.00223.x
Subject(s) - volition (linguistics) , action (physics) , order (exchange) , autonomy , agency (philosophy) , epistemology , conformity , free will , sociology , moral responsibility , philosophy , psychology , law , social psychology , political science , linguistics , finance , quantum mechanics , economics , physics
Contemporary philosophers of action have made some breathtaking advances in understanding central features of agency: action, intention, freedom of the will, moral responsibility, and autonomy. Here I wish to pause to reflect on some of these important ideas, especially about acting freely, moral responsibility, and autonomy. I shall suggest that, whereas great progress has been made, we would benefit from keeping firmly in mind some perhaps subtle—but crucial—distinctions. These distinctions can be obscured by the similar language that we use to refer to importantly different phenomena.1