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DOES NAGEL'S FOOTNOTE ELEVEN SOLVE THE MIND‐BODY PROBLEM?*
Author(s) -
Doggett Tyler,
Stoljar Daniel
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00184.x
Subject(s) - citation , computer science , philosophy , library science
APPEARS CONTINGENT might be held to be true because it appears that the physical facts could be just as they are and no one feels anyway at all—that everyone is a zombie—or because it appears that someone might know all the physical facts and yet not know some mental facts, or for some other reason. Whatever the reason, many philosophers also hold APPEARS CONTINGENT. Those holding both NECESSITATION and APPEARS CONTINGENT face an obvious question. An appearance of a proposition’s contingency is evidence that that proposition is contingent. But in this case, whatever evidence APPEARS CONTINGENT provides for the falsity of NECESSITATION must be defeated, for NECESSITATION is true. What then is it that defeats this evidence? How, to put the question in the terms made famous by Kripke (1980), is this appearance of contingency to be explained away?